Executive summary:
Gray zone warfare operates in the space between peace and outright military conflict. State actors such as China and Russia increasingly favor gray zone tactics—from cyber attacks and disinformation to economic coercion and proxy warfare—because they allow strategic gains while avoiding direct military confrontation.
The impacts are severe. The US loses hundreds of billions of dollars annually in intellectual property through coordinated theft campaigns. Supply chains face mounting pressure from economic warfare. Infrastructure comes under attack through cyber operations that are difficult to attribute. Left unchecked, these activities could fundamentally alter the global balance of power without a shot being fired. The U.S. must develop a comprehensive strategy to counter this growing threat.
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The U.S. Special Operations Command defines gray zone challenges as "competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality." These activities deliberately remain below the threshold of conventional military response, yet they pose significant threats to national security and defense operations.
State actors increasingly choose gray zone tactics because they offer strategic advantages while avoiding direct military confrontation. Russia's influence operations, China's economic coercion, Iran's proxy warfare, and North Korea's cyber campaigns exemplify how adversaries exploit gaps in traditional defense frameworks.
Gray zone warfare has become a critical dimension of modern statecraft, transforming how global actors compete and influence one another without resorting to conventional war. By exploiting the space between peace and armed conflict, gray zone tactics allow state and non-state actors alike to advance their agendas with minimal risk of military reprisal. For adversaries such as China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea, gray zone operations present a cost-effective, high-impact strategy that leverages the vulnerabilities inherent in open, democratic societies and interconnected global systems.
One of the primary appeals of gray zone warfare lies in its ambiguity. By staying below the threshold of traditional conflict, these actors can systematically weaken rivals without provoking a direct military response. Actions like cyber intrusions, economic coercion, disinformation campaigns, and proxy warfare all fall into this murky category of operations, effectively enabling aggressors to destabilize, influence, or control outcomes in target regions or states while maintaining plausible deniability. This ambiguity frustrates traditional defense mechanisms, which are designed to respond decisively to clear and attributable acts of aggression rather than subtle, ongoing campaigns.
Moreover, gray zone tactics are particularly effective against democratic nations that value transparency, rule of law, and public consensus. These characteristics—strengths in a peaceful context—become exploitable vulnerabilities in the gray zone. Open societies are more susceptible to information manipulation, economic coercion, and political influence campaigns, as they often lack the centralized controls that autocratic states can exercise over information, commerce, and national narratives. For instance, China’s use of economic leverage in its Belt and Road Initiative, or Russia’s targeted disinformation efforts in the US and Europe, highlight how gray zone tactics can reshape global perceptions, strain alliances, and undermine the integrity of democratic institutions.
The effectiveness of gray zone warfare is amplified by the current geopolitical landscape. Today’s globalized economy and the pervasive influence of digital platforms provide extensive reach and real-time adaptability for gray zone actors, allowing them to spread influence, control narratives, and destabilize adversaries with unprecedented efficiency. Adversaries can launch diverse, synchronized attacks across multiple domains—from cyber and finance to media and diplomatic channels—creating a cumulative effect that overwhelms and strains the capacity of traditional defense systems to respond.
In short, gray zone warfare is not merely an extension of historical tactics; it is a sophisticated approach to modern competition that challenges conventional notions of security and statecraft. As adversaries increasingly refine these tactics, the United States and its allies must recognize gray zone warfare as a central threat to global stability, one that demands innovative, multi-faceted defense strategies to safeguard national interests and maintain the integrity of the international order.
Gray zone tactics leverage ambiguity and asymmetry to achieve strategic objectives while minimizing the risk of conventional retaliation. These tactics include economic coercion, cyber operations, disinformation, and political influence, all of which exploit legal and operational gray areas that make them difficult to attribute and counter. By operating below the threshold of direct military conflict, gray zone actions create a persistent level of disruption that targets a nation’s internal stability, political cohesion, and economic resilience.
A defining feature of gray zone tactics is their deniability. Adversaries often conduct these operations covertly or through proxies, masking their involvement and complicating the target’s response. By blurring the lines of attribution, gray zone actors sidestep international norms and evade responsibility, making it challenging for affected nations to mount a unified or proportional response. This characteristic is evident in cases such as Russia’s hybrid warfare in Ukraine, where unmarked “little green men” and local proxies have obfuscated Russian state involvement and slowed international responses.
Gray zone tactics also thrive in ambiguous legal zones. The actions that comprise gray zone warfare—such as economic sanctions, cyber espionage, and influence campaigns—often exploit gaps in legal frameworks that govern warfare and state conduct. Cyber operations, for example, fall into a gray area where international law struggles to keep pace with technological advances, leaving room for cyber intrusions that destabilize systems without crossing the legal threshold for acts of war. Similarly, disinformation campaigns targeting democratic elections or social cohesion evade traditional definitions of hostile action, making it difficult to mobilize a coordinated response through existing laws or institutions.
The ultimate aim of gray zone tactics is destabilization. These actions are designed to erode public trust, create divisions within society, and strain political systems, leaving adversaries in a strategically advantageous position. Economic coercion, for example, allows gray zone actors to impose financial and trade pressures on target nations, undermining their economic independence and increasing their vulnerability to external influence. China’s use of economic leverage in global supply chains exemplifies this approach, where selective access to markets and resources exerts pressure on nations without direct confrontation.
Gray zone operations are inherently adaptive and often employ multiple tactics in tandem to create a compounding effect. Cyber operations may be synchronized with disinformation campaigns to amplify fear or mistrust among a target’s population. Economic pressures might be combined with political influence to weaken democratic institutions and sway public opinion toward policies favorable to the aggressor. This synchronized approach increases the psychological impact on the target, as the combined effects can overwhelm a state’s capacity to respond in multiple domains simultaneously.
In sum, gray zone tactics are effective not because they are overwhelming in any single respect, but because they erode stability and sow discord over time. They are calibrated to exploit specific societal and systemic vulnerabilities, destabilizing targets while operating outside the reach of traditional defense responses. To confront these tactics effectively, defenders must develop strategies that address the compounded, ambiguous, and adaptable nature of gray zone threats.
To understand the adaptability and impact of gray zone tactics, it is useful to examine how various state actors employ these methods to pursue their strategic goals in different regions. The following cases—China in the Indo-Pacific, Russia in Eastern Europe, and Iran in the Middle East—demonstrate how gray zone warfare exploits specific regional vulnerabilities and advances national interests without triggering direct military confrontation.
Each of the following cases highlights the flexibility of gray zone tactics to fit specific regional contexts and adversarial goals. China’s economic coercion, Russia’s hybrid tactics, and Iran’s proxy warfare all illustrate how gray zone warfare adapts to exploit particular vulnerabilities, employing strategies that bypass conventional defense mechanisms. These examples underscore the need for a multi-faceted approach to countering gray zone threats, as each case requires tailored responses that address the unique aspects of each adversary’s tactics.
China uses economic influence as a primary vector of gray zone operations throughout the Indo-Pacific, leveraging its economic power to deepen dependencies and shape the policies of smaller nations. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), China has invested in critical infrastructure projects across Asia, Africa, and parts of Europe. However, these investments often come with strings attached, allowing China to influence these countries' domestic and foreign policies by creating debt dependency. For example, Sri Lanka’s transfer of the Hambantota Port to Chinese control due to unsustainable debt obligations illustrates how China’s economic engagements can translate into strategic influence. By using economic tools that fall within the realm of legitimate trade and investment, China advances its regional interests in ways that are difficult to counter within existing frameworks of international law.
Russia’s approach in Eastern Europe exemplifies gray zone warfare through a combination of disinformation, cyber operations, and covert military actions designed to destabilize neighboring states and expand its regional influence. In Ukraine, Russia used a range of ambiguous tactics, from unmarked paramilitary forces (“little green men”) during the annexation of Crimea to extensive disinformation campaigns and cyberattacks aimed at undermining Ukraine’s political stability. Russia’s use of social media platforms to spread divisive narratives and its cyber operations targeting critical infrastructure are part of a larger strategy to weaken Ukraine and challenge NATO. These tactics, calibrated to avoid direct military escalation, complicate attribution and prevent NATO from responding under its Article 5 collective defense clause, thereby allowing Russia to achieve its goals without direct confrontation.
Iran’s reliance on proxy forces is a hallmark of its gray zone strategy in the Middle East. By supporting groups like Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and various militias in Iraq and Syria, Iran extends its influence and undermines regional adversaries, notably Saudi Arabia and Israel, without overt military involvement. These proxies provide Iran with strategic depth and allow it to influence local politics, disrupt opposing forces, and create a deterrent against direct attacks on its own territory. For instance, Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels in Yemen has enabled it to exert pressure on Saudi Arabia, while maintaining plausible deniability and avoiding direct engagement. These proxy relationships allow Iran to further its objectives while remaining insulated from the full consequences of its actions.
U.S. adversaries rely on a range of nuanced tactics that exploit vulnerabilities across multiple domains—cyber, economic, political, and informational. The overarching strategy is to achieve strategic goals without triggering a traditional military response, often by blurring the lines between routine statecraft and overt hostility. This approach enables both state and non-state actors to pursue objectives in ways that, although aggressive, remain difficult to classify as acts of war.
Gray zone tactics are typically characterized by ambiguity and deniability, allowing adversaries to operate beneath the threshold of conventional conflict. This approach limits the defensive options available to traditional military frameworks, complicates attribution, and often renders international norms and legal frameworks ineffective. Through an adaptable combination of these vectors, gray zone actors can destabilize, influence, and coerce their targets while sidestepping direct confrontation attack vectors.
Let’s look closer at some of the major gray zone attack vectors that our adversaries exploit.
American technological superiority faces unprecedented threats from state-sponsored intellectual property theft, research compromise, and talent recruitment campaigns. China's systematic targeting of US technology represents the most comprehensive intellectual property theft campaign in history, costing the U.S. an estimated $225 billion to $600 billion annually. But the impact extends beyond immediate financial losses: this wholesale transfer of innovation threatens future US military and economic power.
The methods are as diverse as they are sophisticated. Chinese intelligence services penetrate corporate networks to steal research data and technical specifications. State-backed companies reverse engineer stolen designs while maintaining plausible deniability. Academic collaboration programs become conduits for transferring sensitive research. Even legitimate business relationships are exploited through forced technology transfers and joint venture requirements.
China's talent recruitment initiatives deserve particular attention. Programs like the Thousand Talents Plan offer lucrative incentives to scientists and researchers working on sensitive technologies. While presented as normal academic recruitment, these programs often require participants to transfer research and technology to Chinese institutions.
The technology protection challenge is complicated by the increasing convergence of civilian and military innovation. Advances in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and biotechnology often have dual-use applications. This makes it difficult to protect sensitive technologies without impeding legitimate research and commercial development. Traditional export controls and security classifications prove inadequate when critical innovations emerge from university labs and private companies rather than government facilities.
Supply chain security adds another layer of complexity. Critical technologies increasingly rely on complex international supply networks that create multiple points of vulnerability. Compromised components, counterfeiting, and backdoors threaten system integrity while providing potential vectors for espionage. The challenge extends beyond hardware—software supply chains face similar risks through compromised development tools and third-party code libraries.
Adversarial state actors, particularly China, engage in widespread espionage against US industry. China's espionage efforts against the United States represent a persistent and multifaceted threat to national security, economic interests, and technological supremacy.
China stands out as the most active and persistent perpetrator of economic espionage and intellectual property theft targeting the United States. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), China has been linked to 90 cyber espionage campaigns since 2000, surpassing Russia by 30%. However, the actual number is likely higher, given the covert nature of these operations.
Focus areas
Chinese espionage efforts primarily target four areas:
These focus areas align closely with China's strategic goals of military modernization, economic advancement, and geopolitical influence.
China and other state actors employ a diverse array of espionage methods:
Estimates place the annual cost of Chinese IP theft to the U.S. economy between $225 billion and $600 billion. This staggering figure underscores the severity of the threat and its potential long-term consequences for U.S. economic competitiveness.
Government involvement in these activities is significant. Approximately 49% of reported incidents directly involved Chinese military or government employees, while 41% involved private Chinese citizens. This suggests a coordinated, state-sponsored approach to espionage and technology acquisition.
While major cyber attacks make headlines, the most damaging digital operations often occur quietly, gradually eroding US advantages through persistent infiltration and data theft. State actors, particularly China and Russia, have moved beyond crude smash-and-grab operations to sophisticated long-term campaigns. These actors plant sleeper backdoors in critical systems, map network vulnerabilities, and quietly position themselves for future operations.
The 2020 SolarWinds attack demonstrated the devastating potential of supply chain compromise. Russian operators inserted malicious code into software updates, gaining access to thousands of government and corporate networks. The sophistication of the operation—which went undetected for months—highlighted how digital warfare has evolved beyond simple network breaches. Rather than immediately exploiting their access, the operators methodically gathered intelligence and expanded their presence across target networks.
Critical infrastructure faces mounting threats from these digital campaigns. Industrial control systems that manage power grids, water treatment facilities, and transportation networks were designed for reliability, not security. State actors have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to penetrate these systems. The 2015 Russian attack on Ukraine's power grid offered a sobering preview of how cyber operations could disrupt civilian infrastructure. Similar vulnerabilities exist across US critical infrastructure.
The rise of ransomware adds another dimension to digital warfare. State-sponsored groups, particularly from North Korea, increasingly use ransomware attacks to generate revenue while testing offensive capabilities. These operations serve multiple purposes: they provide hard currency for sanctioned regimes, demonstrate offensive capabilities, and probe target defenses. The 2017 WannaCry attack, attributed to North Korean operators, infected hundreds of thousands of computers across 150 countries while yielding valuable intelligence about target responses.
Data theft has evolved from crude exfiltration to sophisticated collection operations. Chinese operators in particular excel at aggregating seemingly innocuous data to build detailed intelligence pictures. Personnel records stolen from the Office of Personnel Management, combined with health records, travel data, and other sources, allow China to build comprehensive profiles of potential targets. This "mosaic" approach to intelligence gathering proves particularly effective against traditional defensive measures focused on protecting obviously sensitive data.
Cloud computing and the Internet of Things create new attack surfaces that many organizations struggle to defend. Connected devices multiply potential entry points while generating massive data flows that complicate security monitoring. The shift to cloud services creates shared infrastructure dependencies that could amplify the impact of successful attacks. A single compromise could potentially affect thousands of organizations sharing the same cloud platform.
Today's economic warfare extends far beyond traditional sanctions and trade restrictions, including tactics that can be challenging to defend against because they often exploit legitimate business practices and legal frameworks. Distinguishing between normal commercial activity and strategic manipulation requires careful analysis. Any response must balance protecting critical interests with preserving the open economic system that underpins US prosperity.
China in particular has developed a sophisticated toolkit for weaponizing economic relationships without triggering conventional military responses. Their strategy seems to combine predatory investment, market manipulation, and coercive technology transfer to advance strategic objectives while maintaining plausible deniability.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is an example of how infrastructure development programs can create strategic leverage through financing. In 2017, when Sri Lanka struggled to repay loans for the Hambantota Port, it granted a 99-year lease to a Chinese state-owned enterprise1. While this specific case is verified, similar scenarios could potentially occur in other countries participating in the BRI if they face debt repayment difficulties.
Market manipulation represents another powerful tool in the economic warfare arsenal. Chinese state actors have demonstrated the ability to create artificial supply shortages, manipulate commodity prices, and destabilize competitors through coordinated market actions.
China's strategy to weaken and reshape international institutions represents one of the most sophisticated influence campaigns in history. Unlike crude attempts to subvert organizations through force or bribery, Chinese operators focus on gradually reshaping institutional structures, decision-making processes, and technical standards from within. This patient approach yields lasting strategic advantages while avoiding the backlash that more aggressive tactics might trigger.
Consider China's actions within international standards bodies. Chinese representatives now chair a third of all technical committees in the International Organization for Standardization. This quiet accumulation of influence allows China to embed its preferred approaches into global technical standards, particularly in emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence and quantum computing. The implications extend far beyond technical specifications; by shaping standards, China creates long-term dependencies on Chinese intellectual property and technology platforms.
Academic institutions face equally sophisticated subversion efforts. Chinese talent recruitment programs like the Thousand Talents Plan do more than simply attract researchers—they systematically target scholars working on strategic technologies. These programs often require participants to establish shadow laboratories in China, transfer research findings, and train Chinese students in sensitive technical fields.
The 2020 arrest of Harvard Professor Charles Lieber highlighted how these programs can compromise even leading researchers at premier institutions. Lieber, the chair of Harvard's Chemistry Department, failed to disclose payments from China while working on DOD-funded research..
Professional organizations and think tanks increasingly find themselves targets of state influence operations. China's "United Front" work systematically maps influence pathways within these organizations, identifying key decision-makers and pressure points. Chinese operators then deploy a mix of incentives and pressure to shape organizational positions on sensitive issues. This influence extends beyond obviously China-related topics to include technical standards, research priorities, and policy recommendations that could affect Chinese strategic interests.
Even philanthropic and cultural organizations face sophisticated subversion attempts. The Chinese government has established a network of Confucius Institutes and cultural centers that extend soft power while gathering intelligence and suppressing discussion of sensitive topics. These organizations often establish deep ties with host institutions through funding relationships and joint programs, creating leverage that can be used to influence institutional decisions.
China increasingly weaponizes the US legal system against American companies, particularly those seeking to protect intellectual property. Chinese entities file questionable patent challenges and copyright claims in US courts, forcing American firms to spend significant resources on legal defense. This "lawfare" serves multiple purposes:
Chinese companies often coordinate these legal actions with other pressure tactics, including parallel litigation in Chinese courts, regulatory harassment, and market access restrictions. The goal is to exhaust US companies' resources and will to resist, ultimately forcing them to transfer technology or exit key markets.
This strategic use of the US legal system represents a sophisticated evolution in gray zone tactics, turning America's own institutions into weapons against its economic and security interests.
Modern information warfare represents a fundamental shift in how nations compete for power and influence. While propaganda and disinformation have existed for centuries, today's digital landscape enables influence operations of unprecedented scale and sophistication.
Recent developments demand a fundamental rethinking of how democracies defend themselves in the information space. The speed, scale, and sophistication of modern influence operations overwhelm conventional approaches to counter-disinformation. We need new defensive capabilities that can match the adaptability and reach of AI-enhanced influence campaigns while preserving democratic values and open discourse.
Russia's campaigns during recent US elections demonstrated the devastating potential of coordinated information warfare. By investing relatively modest resources in targeted messaging, Russian operators achieved effects that would have required massive military expenditure in previous eras. They exploited social divisions, undermined faith in democratic institutions, and shaped public discourse—all while maintaining plausible deniability.
The mechanics of these operations reveal careful strategic design. Russian state media outlets such as RT and Sputnik establish core narratives, which networks of proxy accounts then amplify across social platforms.
China's approach to information warfare differs markedly from Russia's but proves equally sophisticated. Rather than primarily sowing discord, Chinese operators focus on reshaping global narratives about key issues such as Taiwan, Hong Kong, and China's role in the international order. They deploy both overt state media and covert influence operations to promote preferred perspectives while suppressing criticism.
The advent of artificial intelligence has dramatically enhanced disinformation and influence capabilities. AI enables operators to generate and adapt content at scale, microtarget specific audiences, and evade conventional detection methods. Perhaps most concerning, AI allows information warriors to rapidly test and refine their techniques, creating an ever-evolving threat that traditional defensive measures struggle to counter.
Gray zone warfare presents a unique challenge to the US and its allies, as these tactics defy conventional military and diplomatic frameworks. Designed to exploit the space between peace and open conflict, gray zone operations capitalize on ambiguity, allowing adversaries to pursue strategic goals without risking direct confrontation. This ambiguity frustrates conventional defense measures, as gray zone actions often evade established definitions of aggression, complicating both attribution and response.
Traditional military and diplomatic frameworks struggle to address threats that do not fit neatly into "peacetime" or "wartime" categories. Defense mechanisms are largely oriented toward identifiable, attributable acts, such as territorial incursions or direct attacks. Gray zone tactics, however, unfold in subtle and incremental ways, staying below the threshold of overt hostility. This approach disrupts defense strategies, leaving allies to grapple with sustained, ambiguous threats that are difficult to counter through traditional responses.
Democratic nations face additional challenges in countering gray zone tactics due to slower, consensus-driven decision-making processes. Adversaries with more centralized decision-making structures, like China and Russia, can respond to events or deploy gray zone tactics with agility and speed, while democratic systems must coordinate across agencies, layers of government, and often with international allies. This asymmetry enables adversaries to leverage gray zone tactics more effectively, as their actions face fewer delays and legal barriers.
Gray zone warfare also takes advantage of gaps in international law. Cyber intrusions, economic coercion, and disinformation, while hostile, often do not meet the legal criteria for acts of war. For example, economic tactics such as influencing supply chains or weaponizing trade dependencies can exert significant pressure on target nations without crossing into conventional definitions of aggression. This legal ambiguity further complicates the development of unified or proportionate responses.
Adversaries in the gray zone frequently aim to weaken alliances and erode societal trust within target countries. By fostering division through disinformation and exploiting political and social vulnerabilities, gray zone tactics destabilize societies from within. Russia’s influence operations across Europe and China’s efforts to reshape narratives in the Indo-Pacific are examples of strategies that seek to divide and weaken alliances like NATO, reducing the collective capacity to respond effectively.
Countering gray zone tactics demands an integrated approach that goes beyond traditional military preparedness. The US and its allies must adapt policy, intelligence, and defense sectors to respond flexibly to these multidimensional threats. Needed adaptations include enhancing public-private partnerships, building resilience within institutions, and investing in intelligence capabilities to preempt and detect gray zone operations. These measures will be essential to countering the sophisticated and persistent threats posed by adversaries operating in the gray zone.
The nature of gray zone warfare requires a shift in how the US and its allies approach national security. A multi-faceted, adaptive strategy—one that addresses the complexities of gray zone tactics across all sectors—will be essential for safeguarding stability and reinforcing the collective resilience of allied nations.
Talbot West is at the forefront of countering gray zone warfare by providing defense organizations with modular, AI-driven solutions tailored to gray zone complexities. Our Cognitive Hive AI (CHAI) architecture is designed to integrate intelligence, enhance decision-making, and adapt to the evolving nature of gray zone threats, offering actionable insights to strengthen defense capabilities. To learn more about how Talbot West can support your organization’s resilience against gray zone threats, contact us for a consultation.
Gray zone warfare consists of hostile activities that fall between peace and outright military conflict. They deliberately remain below the threshold that would trigger conventional military response, while still advancing strategic objectives.
Adversaries favor gray zone tactics because they allow strategic gains while avoiding direct military confrontation with superior U.S. forces. These tactics are cheaper, lower-risk, and offer plausible deniability. For example, China can achieve significant technology transfer through industrial espionage without risking military escalation, while Russia can influence elections through social media campaigns at relatively low cost.
Several factors make gray zone warfare difficult to counter:
AI can enhance gray zone defense through:
However, traditional "black box" AI systems have limitations in sensitive defense applications.
Cognitive hive AI (CHAI) is a modular, configurable AI architecture that uses multiple specialized AI modules working in concert, similar to how a beehive operates. Unlike monolithic AI systems, CHAI offers:
The main vectors include:
These vectors are often used in combination for maximum effect.
Organizations should adopt a comprehensive approach that includes:
Most importantly, defenses must be flexible and adaptable as threats evolve.
The Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) is a Department of Defense strategy that emphasizes breaking down monolithic systems into modules connected by open interfaces. In gray zone defense, MOSA principles are crucial because they:
While both nations employ gray zone tactics, they focus on different areas. China emphasizes economic coercion, industrial espionage, and technology transfer, with a particular focus on acquiring military and commercial technology through systematic theft. Russia, on the other hand, specializes in information warfare and social media manipulation, as demonstrated by its election interference operations. Both nations, however, employ cyber operations and seek to exploit institutional vulnerabilities.
Most AI solutions have the following limitations in gray zone defense:
The whole-of-government approach coordinates responses across multiple agencies through:
This coordination is crucial because gray zone threats often cross traditional agency boundaries and require multiple types of response.
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